Fair allocation in networks with externalities

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.010zbMath1168.91315OpenAlexW2012803029MaRDI QIDQ876889

Noemí Navarro

Publication date: 19 April 2007

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.010

zbMATH Keywords

networksMyerson valueallocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (9)

Internal structure of coalitions in competitive and altruistic graphical coalitional games ⋮ Alliance formation in assembly systems with quality-improvement incentives ⋮ Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation ⋮ The enemy of my enemy is my friend: new conditions for network games ⋮ Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies ⋮ Outside option values for network games ⋮ Sharing a river among satiable agents ⋮ Flexible network rules for identified externalities ⋮ The private value of a patent: a cooperative approach

Cites Work

• Values of games in partition function form
• Networks of collaboration in oligopoly.
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• N‐person games in partition function form

This page was built for publication: Fair allocation in networks with externalities