Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
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Cites work
- A characterization of the position value
- A note on a value with incomplete communication
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- A value with incomplete communication
- Allocation rules for network games
- An implementation of the Owen value.
- Bargaining and Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Forming efficient networks
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- Strongly stable networks
- The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
Cited in
(22)- A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
- Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
- Efficient extensions of communication values
- Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
- An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
- Expected values for variable network games
- A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
- Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games
- Political power on a line graph
- Fair allocation in networks with externalities
- A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
- Probabilistic network values
- Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
- Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
- Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
- Allocation rules for network games
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
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