Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.01.010MaRDI QIDQ2469856zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marco Slikker

Publication date 11 February 2008

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

networkscharacterizationsmechanismsvalue functions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

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Cites work

• A characterization of the position value
• A note on a value with incomplete communication
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A value with incomplete communication
• Allocation rules for network games
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Bargaining and Value
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Forming efficient networks
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
• On the Position Value for Communication Situations
• Strongly stable networks
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games

Cited in

(22)

• A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
• A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
• Connectivity and Allocation Rule in a Directed Network
• Efficient extensions of communication values
• Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
• An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
• Expected values for variable network games
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
• Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games
• Political power on a line graph
• Fair allocation in networks with externalities
• A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
• Probabilistic network values
• Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
• Networks, communication and hierarchy: applications to cooperative games
• Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement
• Allocation rules for network games
• Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
• Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms

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