Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
- An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
Cited in
(21)- The Myerson value for directed graph games
- Efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- Solidarity value for graph games
- Efficient extensions of communication values
- The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions
- On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs
- Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
- Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure
- Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values
- The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
- An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure
- Solidarity within a fixed community
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games
- Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs
- An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
- Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games
- A new family of solutions for graph-restricted cooperative games: rethinking the weight of intermediary power
- Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
- Essential Players in Cooperative Games with Graph Communication Structure
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