Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1925896
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.020zbMath1254.91021MaRDI QIDQ1925896
Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal
Publication date: 27 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36857/1/MPRA_paper_36857.pdf
fairness; Myerson value; component-wise egalitarian solutions; fairness for neighbors; two-step value
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure, Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games, An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure, Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games, The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations, Efficient extensions of the Myerson value, Efficient extensions of communication values, On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs, Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs, Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value, The Myerson value for directed graph games, The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions, Solidarity within a fixed community, Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values, An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games, Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value, Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
- An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
