The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions
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Publication:2326080
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Cites work
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
- Allocation rules for network games
- An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
- Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3168330 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Random graphs.
- The Shapley value for directed graph games
- Values of games with probabilistic graphs
- Values of games with weighted graphs
Cited in
(11)- The Myerson value for union stable structures
- The Myerson value for complete coalition structures
- The Myerson value for directed graph games
- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
- The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense
- A note on a value with incomplete communication
- An axiomatization of the Myerson value
- A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
- A normalization of the Myerson value with the matrix approach
- Graph games and edge density of graphs
- Splitting graphs when calculating Myerson value for pure overhead games.
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