An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.08.026zbMath1283.91021OpenAlexW2116263596MaRDI QIDQ2440450

Gerard van der Laan, Anna B. Khmelnitskaya, René van den Brink

Publication date: 18 March 2014

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.tinbergen.nl/11052.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamecommunication graphMyerson value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (23)

Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games ⋮ Efficient quotient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs ⋮ Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values ⋮ Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions ⋮ Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value ⋮ The efficient partition surplus Owen graph value ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value based on endogenous claims from players ⋮ The probabilistic Harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ The Myerson value for directed graph games ⋮ Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations ⋮ Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data ⋮ The efficient proportional Myerson values ⋮ The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games ⋮ The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions

Cites Work

• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Unnamed Item

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