Solidarity in games with a coalition structure

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.08.004MaRDI QIDQ607264zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Emilio Calvo, Esther Gutiérrez

Publication date 19 November 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://www.uv.es/erices/RePEc/WP/2010/0810.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Owen valuesolidaritygames with a coalition structurethe two-step Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3839628 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Modification of the Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure
• On coalitional semivalues
• On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
• On weighted Shapley values
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
• The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• Value Theory Without Efficiency
• Weighted coalition structure values

Cited in

(17)

• Corrigendum to: ``A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
• New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property
• Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
• The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
• Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
• A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
• A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• On new characterizations of the Owen value
• The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
• The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
• Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
• A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures

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