Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
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Publication:607264
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3839628 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A two-step Shapley value for cooperative games with coalition structures
- A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Cooperative games with coalition structures
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Modification of the Banzhaf value for games with a coalition structure
- On coalitional semivalues
- On the Existence and Interpretation of Value Allocation
- On weighted Shapley values
- Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Weighted coalition structure values
Cited in
(17)- Corrigendum to: ``A new axiomatization of the Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- The Shapley value for cooperative games with restricted worths
- New characterizations of the Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values using the intracoalitional balanced contributions property
- Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
- The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value
- Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game
- A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- On new characterizations of the Owen value
- The weighted Shapley-egalitarian value for cooperative games with a coalition structure
- The Shapley-solidarity value for games with a coalition structure
- Core in a simple coalition formation game
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- Allocation rules for coalitional network games
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
- A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures
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