A proportional value for cooperative games with a coalition structure

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9420-9zbMath1377.91020OpenAlexW2005930968MaRDI QIDQ2353581

Frank Huettner

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9420-9

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyShapley valueOwen valueproportional value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (8)

A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games ⋮ The proportional Shapley value and applications ⋮ Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems ⋮ Duality in land rental problems ⋮ The Egalitarian efficient extension of the Aumann-Drèze value ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value ⋮ Weighted Shapley hierarchy levels values ⋮ Axiomatizations of the proportional division value

Cites Work

• Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
• Equal or proportional division of a surplus, and other methods
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
• The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
• The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
• Semiproportional values for TU games
• The proportional value for positive cooperative games
• Capacity planning with sequential two-level time constraints in the back-end process of wafer fabrication
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
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