On coalitional semivalues
\textit{G. Owen} [in: Essays in Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, Lect. Notes Econ. Math. Syst. 141, 76--88 (1977; Zbl 0395.90095)] introduced the concept of coalitional value for transferable utility games. In this frame it was proposed a generalization of the Shapley value to the coalitional structure after this important results other authors proposed some interesting results in this direction: \textit{S. Hart} and \textit{M. Kurz} [Econometrica 51, 1047--1064 (1983; Zbl 0523.90097)] and \textit{P. Dubey, P. Neiman} and \textit{R. J. Weber} [Math. Oper. Res. 6, 122--128 (1981; Zbl 0496.90096)]. The aim of this paper is to propose an alternative axiomatization of the coalitional value by means of three axioms (carrier, additivity and generalized anonymity). In this way authors define and study coalitional semivalues as generalizations of semivalues (see Dubey et al (1981)).
- Generalized coalitional semivalues
- Algebraic coalitions
- Coalitional values and generalized characteristic functions
- Coalitional values for cooperative games with r alternatives
- Notes on coalition lattices
- Coalition values derived from methods for comparison of coalition influence for games in characteristic function form
- Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
- Axiomatizations of the Owen value without efficiency
- The multilinear extension and the symmetric coalition Banzhaf value
- Decompositions of inequality measures from the perspective of the Shapley-Owen value
- The Owen and Banzhaf-Owen values revisited
- Some open problems in simple games
- Strategically supported cooperation in dynamic games with coalition structures
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4167877 (Why is no real title available?)
- Semiselective coideals
- Bargaining and membership
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- Technical note: Characterization of binomial semivalues through delegation games
- Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
- A method to calculate generalized mixed modified semivalues: application to the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012--2016)
- A general procedure to compute mixed modified semivalues for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks
- The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure
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