Value Theory Without Efficiency
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(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Mew mathematical properties of the semivalues of cooperative tu games*
- Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure
- A decomposition for the space of games with externalities
- Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games
- Semivalues as power indices.
- Risk Exchange with Distorted Probabilities
- Voting and power
- Probabilistic spatial power indexes
- A general procedure to compute mixed modified semivalues for cooperative games with structure of coalition blocks
- Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations
- Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
- Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games
- The multilinear extension and the symmetric coalition Banzhaf value
- Decompositions of inequality measures from the perspective of the Shapley-Owen value
- Coalitional games for networked controllers with constraints on semivalues: a randomized design approach
- Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
- Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley-Shubik power index
- Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques
- Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
- Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
- A measure of aggregate power in organizations
- Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value
- Rankings and values for team games
- NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
- Power index rankings in bicameral legislatures and the US legislative system
- Axiomatizations of the Owen value without efficiency
- Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
- Comparing power indices
- An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
- Cooperative game as non-additive measure
- Values for two-stage games: Another view of the Shapley axioms
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Games of bounded deviation, additivizations of games and asymptotic martingales
- Potentials in cooperative TU-games
- The prediction value
- Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
- CONSISTENCY FOR PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS
- The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games
- Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
- The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games
- On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
- A theory of dichotomous valuation with applications to variable selection
- Values and semivalues on subspaces of finite games
- Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
- Efficient Shapley performance attribution for least-squares regression
- Coalition-weighted Shapley values
- On the semivalues and the power core of cooperative TU games
- Some surprising properties of power indices.
- Decomposition of interaction indices: alternative interpretations of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
- Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
- A note on multinomial probabilistic values
- Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
- Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value
- Semivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games
- A method to calculate generalized mixed modified semivalues: application to the Catalan Parliament (legislature 2012--2016)
- Accessibility in oriented networks
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game
- Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies
- On coalitional semivalues
- Fair Attribution of Functional Contribution in Artificial and Biological Networks
- On membership and marginal values
- Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
- Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
- A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
- Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
- ASPECTS OF EXCHANGEABILITY IN THE SHAPLEY VALUE
- Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
- The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
- Indices of criticality in simple games
- Random order coalition structure values
- A new potential concept for bisemivalues
- Some recursive definitions for linear values of cooperative TU games
- Characterizing the Banzhaf and Shapley values assuming limited linearity
- On the relationship between Shapley and Owen values
- The Banzhaf value for 2 2 exact assignment games is replication invariant
- Vector space of cooperative games: construction of basis related with solutions based on marginal contributions and determination of games with predefined allocations
- On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
- The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
- Generalized coalitional semivalues
- Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling
- Potential, value, and coalition formation
- Shapley Effects for Global Sensitivity Analysis: Theory and Computation
- An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues
- Cooperative games with homogeneous groups of participants
- Decisiveness indices are semiindices
- Minimal winning coalitions and orders of criticality
- Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
- Influence and interaction indexes for pseudo-Boolean functions: a unified least squares approach
- Some open problems in simple games
- Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
- Truncated egalitarian solutions
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- Lexicographic composition of simple games
- On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
- On the semivalues and the least square values average per capita formulas and relationships
- Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
- A note on regular semivalues
- Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
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