Value Theory Without Efficiency

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Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index
Partnership formation and binomial semivalues
Potential, value, and coalition formation
Generalized coalitional semivalues
A measure of aggregate power in organizations
Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game
An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
Weak values, the core, and new axioms for the Shapley value
Characterizing the Nash bargaining solution without Pareto-optimality
Values and semivalues on subspaces of finite games
Characterizing the Banzhaf and Shapley values assuming limited linearity
Games of bounded deviation, additivizations of games and asymptotic martingales
Random order coalition structure values
Potentials in cooperative TU-games
Semivalues as power indices.
Centrality and power in social networks: A game theoretic approach.
Semivalues: weighting coefficients and allocations on unanimity games
Decomposition of solutions and the Shapley value
Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index
Decisiveness indices are semiindices
Generalized additive games
Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games
A note on multinomial probabilistic values
The modified Banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: An axiomatic characterization.
Accessibility measures to nodes of directed graphs using solutions for generalized cooperative games
Some properties for bisemivalues on bicooperative games
Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs
Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies
Minimal winning coalitions and orders of criticality
Weak null, necessary defender and necessary detractor players: characterizations of the Banzhaf and the Shapley bisemivalues
Coalitional games for networked controllers with constraints on semivalues: a randomized design approach
Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity
Power and potential maps induced by any semivalue: some algebraic properties and computation by multilinear extensions
Coalitional games induced by matching problems: complexity and islands of tractability for the Shapley value
Power index rankings in bicameral legislatures and the US legislative system
Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value
Ranking sets of interacting objects via semivalues
On membership and marginal values
The prediction value
On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values
Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters
Lexicographic composition of simple games
On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues
The Burkill-Cesari integral on spaces of absolutely continuous games
Partnership formation and multinomial values
Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
Probabilistic spatial power indexes
Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions
Axiomatic characterizations of the symmetric coalitional binomial semivalues
Axiomatizations of the Owen value without efficiency
An axiomatic approach to the measurement of the amount of interaction among criteria or players
Compound voting and the Banzhaf index
The multilinear extension and the symmetric coalition Banzhaf value
On the semivalues and the least square values average per capita formulas and relationships
An axiomatic characterization for regular semivalues
Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
Decompositions of inequality measures from the perspective of the Shapley-Owen value
A note on regular semivalues
On the semivalues and the power core of cooperative TU games
Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
Comparing power indices
Some open problems in simple games
Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
Vector space of cooperative games: construction of basis related with solutions based on marginal contributions and determination of games with predefined allocations
Shapley Effects for Global Sensitivity Analysis: Theory and Computation
A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions
Separability by semivalues modified for games with coalition structure
Risk Exchange with Distorted Probabilities
Reconstructing a simple game from a uniparametric family of allocations
SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
Mew mathematical properties of the semivalues of cooperative tu games^*
Some recursive definitions for linear values of cooperative TU games
Voting and power
Influence and interaction indexes for pseudo-Boolean functions: a unified least squares approach
CONSISTENCY FOR PROPORTIONAL SOLUTIONS
NULL PLAYERS OUT? LINEAR VALUES FOR GAMES WITH VARIABLE SUPPORTS
Fair Attribution of Functional Contribution in Artificial and Biological Networks
Generating semivalues via unanimity games
The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games
A decomposition for the space of games with externalities
Cooperative game as non-additive measure
Rankings and values for team games
On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games
An axiomatization for two power indices for (3,2)-simple games
Indices of criticality in simple games
ASPECTS OF EXCHANGEABILITY IN THE SHAPLEY VALUE
Bisemivalues for bicooperative games
A theory of dichotomous valuation with applications to variable selection
Some surprising properties of power indices.
Multilinear extensions and values for multichoice games
Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
On the relationship between Shapley and Owen values
Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom
A new family of regular semivalues and applications
Cross invariance, the Shapley value, and the Shapley-Shubik power index
Efficient Shapley performance attribution for least-squares regression
Coalition-weighted Shapley values
Decomposition of interaction indices: alternative interpretations of cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices

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