Influence and interaction indexes for pseudo-Boolean functions: a unified least squares approach
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Abstract: The Banzhaf power and interaction indexes for a pseudo-Boolean function (or a cooperative game) appear naturally as leading coefficients in the standard least squares approximation of the function by a pseudo-Boolean function of a specified degree. We first observe that this property still holds if we consider approximations by pseudo-Boolean functions depending only on specified variables. We then show that the Banzhaf influence index can also be obtained from the latter approximation problem. Considering certain weighted versions of this approximation problem, we introduce a class of weighted Banzhaf influence indexes, analyze their most important properties, and point out similarities between the weighted Banzhaf influence index and the corresponding weighted Banzhaf interaction index. We also discuss the issue of reconstructing a pseudo-Boolean function from prescribed influences and point out very different behaviors in the weighted and non-weighted cases.
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- Axiomatic characterizations of generalized values
- Axiomatic characterizations of probabilistic and cardinal-probabilistic interaction indices
- Equivalent representations of set functions
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
- The influence of variables on pseudo-Boolean functions with applications to game theory and multicriteria decision making
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- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games
Cited in
(7)- Approximations of pseudo-Boolean functions; applications to game theory
- Measuring the interactions among variables of functions over the unit hypercube
- Approximations of Lovász extensions and their induced interaction index
- Symmetric approximations of pseudo-Boolean functions with applications to influence indexes
- Weighted Banzhaf power and interaction indexes through weighted approximations of games
- Equivalent representations of set functions
- The influence of variables on pseudo-Boolean functions with applications to game theory and multicriteria decision making
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