Voting and power
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
Cites work
- Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
- Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule
- Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index
- Nonsymmetric Nash solutions and replications of 2-person bargaining
- On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
- Power indices and the veil of ignorance
- SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
- Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
- The bargaining problem
- Value Theory Without Efficiency
- Voting and collective decision-making. Bargaining and power
Cited in
(6)
This page was built for publication: Voting and power
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4644756)