Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00011-0MaRDI QIDQ1296507zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dan S. Felsenthal, Moshé Machover

Publication date 1 February 2001

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00011-0

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf power indexequal suffragemajoritarianismmean majority deficitsimple voting gamesquare-root rulestwo-tier decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
• Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
• Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)
• Fair majorities in proportional voting
• Simple majority achievable hierarchies

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1470897 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index

Cited in

(10)

• Fair representation and a linear Shapley rule
• Collective bias models in two-tier voting systems and the democracy deficit
• A note on the direct democracy deficit in two-tier voting
• Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
• Voting and power
• Square root voting system, optimal threshold and \(\pi\)
• Majority Efficient Representation of the Citizens in a Federal Union
• Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations
• Optimal weights in a two-tier voting system with mean-field voters
• Egalitarianism and utilitarianism in committees of representatives

This page was built for publication: Minimizing the mean majority deficit: The second square-root rule

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1296507)