Gerrymander-proof representative democracies

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2zbMath1259.91028MaRDI QIDQ444122

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent R. Merlin

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0298-2

zbMATH Keywords

manipulation; federal voting rules; Gerrymandering

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

90B50: Management decision making, including multiple objectives

91A35: Decision theory for games

Related Items

Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures, On avoiding vote swapping, Vote trading and subset sums, Axiomatic districting, Multilevel multidimensional consistent aggregators

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