The prediction value

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1012-XzbMATH Open1392.91008DBLPjournals/scw/KosterKLN17arXiv1311.5728OpenAlexW2132096522WikidataQ59602597 ScholiaQ59602597MaRDI QIDQ2397666FDOQ2397666

Authors: Maurice Koster, Sascha Kurz, Ines Lindner, Stefan Napel 

Publication date: 23 May 2017

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of $v(S)$ when $i$ cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every $n$-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.5728

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zbMATH Keywords

influencecooperative gamesShapley valueBanzhaf valuevoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cited In (4)

• The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
• On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
• New characterizations and a concept of potential for each multinomial (probabilistic) value
• Predictive evaluation of human value segmentations

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