The prediction value

DOI10.1007/S00355-016-1012-XMaRDI QIDQ2397666zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Maurice Koster, Sascha Kurz, Ines Lindner, Stefan Napel

Publication date 23 May 2017

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1311.5728, http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00355-016-1012-x

zbMATH Keywords

Banzhaf valuecooperative gamesinfluenceShapley valuevoting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Abstract: We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player $i$'s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of $v(S)$ when $i$ cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every $n$-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.

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Cited in

(5)

• On influence and compromise in two-tier voting systems
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• The probabilistic games and the Shapley function
• The expected Shapley value on a class of probabilistic TU games

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