On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.08.004zbMath1137.91314MaRDI QIDQ2427211

Francesc Carreras, Josep Freixas

Publication date: 8 May 2008

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

desirability; automorphism; power index; simple game; semivalue; linear game; weakly linear game; swap robustness; transitive game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)

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