Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies

DOI10.1016/J.ARTINT.2022.103792MaRDI QIDQ2093400zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Oskar Skibski, Takamasa Suzuki, Tomasz Grabowski, Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo, Tomasz P. Michalak

Publication date 8 November 2022

Published in Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103792

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamesMyerson valuerestrictionssigned graphs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

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Cited in

(5)

• Complexity of computing the Shapley value in partition function form games
• Allocation rules for communication situations with incompatibilities
• The Myerson value for games with weighted signed networks
• k-boundedness, feasible communication structures, and the Myerson value
• Measuring influence in command games

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