Measuring influence in command games

DOI10.1007/s00355-008-0350-8zbMath1190.91017MaRDI QIDQ839616

Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska

Publication date: 2 September 2009

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-008-0350-8

zbMATH Keywords

power index; Shapley-Shubik index; Banzhaf index; command games; command influence function; weighted influence index

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B12: Voting theory

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Lattices in Social Networks with Influence, From observable behaviors to structures of interaction in binary games of strategic complements, Influence functions, followers and command games, A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions, Values for Markovian coalition processes, Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games, A study of the dynamic of influence through differential equations, NONCOOPERATIVE GAMES FROM TU GAMES WITH INFORMATION COST

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