Cooperation when some players are incompatible
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Publication:3142159
Recommendations
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- \(n\)-person cooperative games with transferable utility. I: The formation of coalitions
- Strategic transfers between cooperative games
- The center value: a sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs
- Values for cooperative games over graphs and games with inadmissible coalitions
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 970204 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Restriction of simple games
- Values of Graph-Restricted Games
Cited in
(15)- \(n\)-person cooperative games with transferable utility. I: The formation of coalitions
- Strategic transfers between cooperative games
- The effects of excluding coalitions
- Cooperation indices and coalitional value
- Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
- Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies
- Cooperation among agents with a proximity relation
- Allocation rules for coalitional network games
- Allocation rules for communication situations with incompatibilities
- The center value: a sharing rule for cooperative games on acyclic graphs
- A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
- Games and cooperation indices
- Stable cooperation in graph-restricted games
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure
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