Cooperation when some players are incompatible

DOI10.1007/BF01414214zbMATH Open0794.90081OpenAlexW1993804165MaRDI QIDQ3142159FDOQ3142159

Authors: G. Bergantiños, Francesc Carreras, Ignacio García-Jurado 

Publication date: 8 December 1993

Published in: ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01414214

Recommendations

• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
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zbMATH Keywords

bargainingShapley valuetransferable utilitysimple gamescooperation structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• Restriction of simple games
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (11)

• \(n\)-person cooperative games with transferable utility. I: The formation of coalitions
• The effects of excluding coalitions
• Cooperation indices and coalitional value
• Computing Banzhaf-Coleman and Shapley-Shubik power indices with incompatible players
• Measuring power in coalitional games with friends, enemies and allies
• Allocation rules for coalitional network games
• Allocation rules for communication situations with incompatibilities
• A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
• Games and cooperation indices
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• The class of ASN-position values. Centrality and consequences of connection failure

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