The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
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Publication:1913284
DOI10.1006/game.1996.0003zbMath0844.90124OpenAlexW2060965795MaRDI QIDQ1913284
Margarita Vázquez-Brage, Ignacio Garcia-Jurado, Francesc Carreras
Publication date: 8 July 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0003
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