Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
From MaRDI portal
Publication:532765
DOI10.1007/S00182-009-0211-4zbMATH Open1211.91042OpenAlexW2036307844MaRDI QIDQ532765FDOQ532765
Authors: Takumi Kongo
Publication date: 5 May 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://waseda.repo.nii.ac.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=28115&item_no=1&attribute_id=77&file_no=1
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- A characterization of the position value
- Monotonic games are spanning network games
- The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense
Cited In (8)
- A core-allocation for a network restricted linear production game
- The degree value for games with communication structure
- Monotonicity of power in weighted voting games with restricted communication
- The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense
- Marginality and the position value
- A new value for communication situations
- Adaptive allocation rules for hypergraph games
- The position value and the structures of graphs
This page was built for publication: Difference between the position value and the myerson value is due to the existence of coalition structures
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q532765)