Power, Cooperation Indices and Coalition Structures

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13zbMath1419.91033OpenAlexW1865008297MaRDI QIDQ4644761

Rafael Amer, Francesc Carreras

Publication date: 8 January 2019

Published in: Power, Voting, and Voting Power: 30 Years After (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35929-3_13

zbMATH Keywords

powercoalition structuresvoting situations, TU-game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (2)

Indices of Criticality in Simple Games ⋮ Reflections on Power, Voting, and Voting Power

Cites Work

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• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Games and cooperation indices
• The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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