Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure

DOI10.1007/S11750-014-0324-1zbMath1310.91025OpenAlexW2146871408MaRDI QIDQ2343068

Gerard van der Laan, Nigel Moes, René van den Brink

Publication date: 4 May 2015

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11750-014-0324-1

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamesShapley valuecoalition structurescommunication graphsnatural gas game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74)

Related Items (5)

A value for cooperative games with coalition and probabilistic graph structures ⋮ On egalitarian values for cooperative games with a priori unions ⋮ The \(\alpha \)-egalitarian Myerson value of games with communication structure ⋮ Values for cooperative games with a prior unions and a communication graph based on combined effects ⋮ Constructive and blocking power in collaborative transportation

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
• Value of games with two-layered hypergraphs
• Values of games with graph restricted communication and a priori unions
• Conference structures and fair allocation rules
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• Sharing a river.
• The Owen value applied to games with graph-restricted communication
• Values for games with two-level communication structures
• Values of Graph-Restricted Games
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game

This page was built for publication: Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure