On weighted Shapley values
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Nonsymmetric Shapley values for coalitional form games with transferable utility are studied. The nonsymmetries are modeled through nonsymmetric weight systems defined on the players of the games. It is shown axiomatically that two families of solutions of this type are possible. These families are strongly related to each other through the duality relationship on games. While the first family lends itself to applications of nonsymmetric revenue sharing problems the second family is suitable for applications of cost allocation problems. The intersection of these two families consists essentially of the symmetric Shapley value. These families are also characterized by a probabilistic arrival time to the game approach. It is also demonstrated that lack of symmetries may arise naturally when players in a game represent nonequal size constituencies.
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3138565 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3867093 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3779139 (Why is no real title available?)
- Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
- Multilinear Extensions of Games
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