An axiomatization of success

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0671-5zbMATH Open1288.91053OpenAlexW2138324375MaRDI QIDQ2453440FDOQ2453440

Authors: M. J. Albizuri, Annick Laruelle 

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-012-0671-5

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• On weighted Shapley values
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations
• Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited.
• Weighted weak semivalues
• Semivalues of Simple Games
• SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (2)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• How success breeds success

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