Weighted values and the core

DOI10.1007/BF01240250MaRDI QIDQ1196701zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dov Monderer, Dov Samet, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coreShapley valueconvex gamesweighted value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827624 (Why is no real title available?)
• Consistent conditional systems in noncooperative game theory
• Cores of convex games
• Multilinear Extensions of Games
• Multistage Games with Communication
• On weighted Shapley values
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• The space of conditional systems is a ball

Cited in

(36)

• Weighted values and the core in NTU games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
• Insurance with multiple insurers: a game-theoretic approach
• Conditional systems revisited
• Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations
• Instrumental values
• Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions
• Coalition-weighted Shapley values
• On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
• The selectope for bicooperative games
• A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value
• Weighted position values
• The value of the four values
• On merge properties of the Shapley value
• A linear proportional effort allocation rule
• TU-reduced games and their cores
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
• Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
• Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
• Towards an axiomatization of the core-center
• THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS
• Marginalist and efficient values for TU games
• On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
• Conditional belief types
• Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games.
• WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
• Sharp and blunt values
• The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization
• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions
• Random reduction consistency of the Weber set, the core and the anti-core

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