Weighted values and the core

DOI10.1007/BF01240250MaRDI QIDQ1196701zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Dov Monderer, Dov Samet, Lloyd S. Shapley

Publication date 16 January 1993

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240250

zbMATH Keywords

convex gamescoreShapley valueweighted value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Review text

A weighted value of a game is a generalization of the Shapley value with different weights for the players, whereby subsets of players with zero weight have there own internal weight system. It is shown that the core of an arbitrary game is contained in the set of weighted value vectors. For convex games the two sets coincide.

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Cites work

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• Potential, Value, and Consistency
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• The space of conditional systems is a ball

Cited in

(43)

• A linear proportional effort allocation rule
• The value of the four values
• Weighted nucleoli
• Marginalist and efficient values for TU games
• Hierarchical Arrow social welfare functions
• Cooperative games with hedonic coalitions
• Sharp and blunt values
• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• Weighted values and the core in NTU games
• On axiomatizations of the weighted Shapley values
• The evolution of social and economic networks.
• Hierarchical constrained egalitarianism in TU-games.
• Conditional systems revisited
• Weighted position values
• A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value
• The selectope for bicooperative games
• Weak addition invariance and axiomatization of the weighted Shapley value
• On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games
• Towards an axiomatization of the core-center
• Random reduction consistency of the Weber set, the core and the anti-core
• Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions
• Pairwise solutions and the core of transportation situations
• How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
• On merge properties of the Shapley value
• Instrumental values
• Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value
• TU-reduced games and their cores
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1487898 (Why is no real title available?)
• WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
• On Harsanyi dividends and asymmetric values
• THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS
• Conditional belief types
• WEBER POLYHEDRON AND WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUES
• Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values
• The interval Shapley value: an axiomatization
• Coalition-weighted Shapley values
• A necessary and sufficient condition for weighted Shapley values in the core
• Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach
• Inheritance of weighted average-convexity in communication situations
• Axiomatization of the core of positive games
• Insurance with multiple insurers: a game-theoretic approach
• Weighted Shapley values and allocation of portfolio risk: one approach to solve the low-risk puzzle?

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