On proper Shapley values for monotone TU-games

DOI10.1007/S00182-014-0439-5MaRDI QIDQ2349419zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors M. Zelený, René van den Brink, René Levínský

Publication date 22 June 2015

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-014-0439-5

zbMATH Keywords

fixed pointproper Shapley valueproportionalityShapley mappingweighted Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cited in

(12)

• The proportional Shapley value and applications
• On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
• Value dividends, the Harsanyi set and extensions, and the proportional Harsanyi solution
• Axiomatizations of the proportional division value
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• Sharing the surplus and proportional values
• The Shapley value, the proper Shapley value, and sharing rules for cooperative ventures
• The weighted-egalitarian Shapley values
• Axiomatizations of the proportional Shapley value
• On merge properties of the Shapley value
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1474748 (Why is no real title available?)

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