THE WEIGHTED CORE WITH DISTINGUISHED COALITIONS

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000174zbMath1138.91008MaRDI QIDQ4661978

Magdalena Cantisani, Ezio Marchi

Publication date: 30 March 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Cooperative gamecoreweightbalanced coalitionsdistributed coalitions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (2)

PARTITIONING GAMES WITH RESTRICTED COOPERATION ⋮ A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

Cites Work

• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• Some recent results inn-person game theory

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