ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE
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Publication:2883135
DOI10.1142/S0219198911002915zbMath1237.91146MaRDI QIDQ2883135
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198911002915
91A12: Cooperative games
91A06: (n)-person games, (n>2)
91B32: Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.)
Related Items
Cooperative provision of indivisible public goods, A new look at the role of players' weights in the weighted Shapley value
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