A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
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Publication:2358794
DOI10.1007/S00199-016-0996-XzbMath1404.91150OpenAlexW1621484165MaRDI QIDQ2358794
María Gómez-Rúa, Juan J. Vidal-Puga
Publication date: 16 June 2017
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62923/1/MPRA_paper_62923.pdf
cost sharingweighted Shapley valueminimum cost spanning tree problemscost monotonicitymerge-proofnesscore selection
Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Sharing the cost of risky projects ⋮ Sharing cost of network among users with differentiated willingness to pay ⋮ Profit-sharing and efficient time allocation
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