An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes

DOI10.1007/S00199-015-0879-6zbMATH Open1367.91037OpenAlexW333800723MaRDI QIDQ747347FDOQ747347

Authors: Jean-François Caulier, Michel Grabisch, Agnieszka Rusinowska 

Publication date: 23 October 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01207823/file/allocation-rule-dynamic3.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

Markov chaindynamic networkscharacterizationnetwork gamelink-based allocation rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited In (4)

• Combinatorial Aspects of Move-Up Crews for Spreading Processes on Networks
• Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation
• A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
• Allocation rules for network games

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