An allocation rule for dynamic random network formation processes
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- (Non-)existence and scope of Nash networks
- A characterization of the position value
- A dynamic model of network formation
- A new weight scheme for the Shapley value
- A note on a value with incomplete communication
- A note on the weak sequential core of dynamic TU games
- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
- A probabilistic position value
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- A value with incomplete communication
- Allocation rules for hypergraph communication situations
- Allocation rules for network games
- An axiomatic characterization of the position value for network situations
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
- Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Communication situations with asymmetric players.
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Dynamic network formation with incomplete information
- Expected fair allocation in farsighted network formation
- Farsighted network formation
- Farsightedly stable networks
- Forming efficient networks
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
- Link formation in cooperative situations.
- Networks and farsighted stability
- Non-myopic formation of circle networks
- On the Position Value for Communication Situations
- On the core of dynamic cooperative games
- On weighted Shapley values
- Social and economic networks.
- Stability and equilibrium selection in a link formation game
- Stochastic bankruptcy games
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- The core of a repeated \(n\)-person cooperative game
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
- Transferable utility games with uncertainty
- Values for Markovian coalition processes
- WEIGHTED MYERSON VALUE
- Weighted position values
Cited in
(6)- Stochastic model of network formation with asymmetric players
- Stochastic model of network formation with asymmetric players
- Directed networks, allocation properties and hierarchy formation
- Combinatorial Aspects of Move-Up Crews for Spreading Processes on Networks
- A monotonic and merge-proof rule in minimum cost spanning tree situations
- Allocation rules for network games
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