The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
DOI10.1007/S11238-014-9463-YzbMATH Open1377.91019OpenAlexW2118857764MaRDI QIDQ892979FDOQ892979
Authors: Sylvain Béal, Amandine Ghintran, Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila 
Publication date: 13 November 2015
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01098766/file/1440.pdf
Recommendations
- A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
- Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
- A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- On totally balanced games arising from cooperation in fair division
- A Group-Strategyproof Cost Sharing Mechanism for the Steiner Forest Game
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4116341
- Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
- The equal split-off set for cooperative games
- On the maximum income spanning forest games
Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Games involving graphs (91A43)
Cites Work
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Sequencing games
- Games with permission structures: The conjunctive approach
- Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Collusion properties of values
- The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
- An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- Weighted component fairness for forest games
- Game Engineering
- Coalition configurations and the Banzhaf index
- Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks
- Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
- Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications
- The socially stable core in structured transferable utility games
- Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
- Tree, web and average web values for cycle-free directed graph games
- Vertical wage differences in hierarchically structured firms
- An axiomatization of the modified Banzhaf Coleman index
- The river sharing problem: a survey
Cited In (7)
- Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
- Sequential sharing rules for river sharing problems
- Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
- Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
- Composition properties in the river claims problem
- Sharing a river.
- A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games
This page was built for publication: The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q892979)
