Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2016.03.011zbMATH Open1347.91035OpenAlexW2299263565MaRDI QIDQ323311FDOQ323311

Authors: Junghum Park, Biung-Ghi Ju 

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.011

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorynetwork gameTU-gamecollusion neutralityhierarchical outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Collusion properties of values
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• Coalitional manipulation on networks
• Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
• Non-manipulable division rules in claim problems and generalizations

Cited In (4)

• Efficiency and collusion neutrality in cooperative games and networks
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
• The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
• Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

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