Hierarchical outcomes and collusion neutrality on networks

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.011zbMath1347.91035OpenAlexW2299263565MaRDI QIDQ323311

Junghum Park, Biung-Ghi Ju

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2016.03.011

zbMATH Keywords

game theorynetwork gameTU-gamecollusion neutralityhierarchical outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (3)

The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations ⋮ The balanced contributions property for symmetric players ⋮ Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities

Cites Work

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• A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
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• Rooted-tree solutions for tree games
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Collusion properties of values
• Equal treatment, symmetry and Banzhaf value axiomatizations
• Coalitional manipulation on networks
• The average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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