A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games

DOI10.1051/RO/2017024MaRDI QIDQ4611491zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dengfeng Li, Xunfeng Hu

Publication date 18 January 2019

Published in RAIRO - Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2017024

zbMATH Keywords

dummifying playerequal division valueequal surplus division valuenullifying playerTU game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites work

• A new basis and the Shapley value
• Axiomatizations and a Noncooperative Interpretation of the α-CIS Value
• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Axioms of invariance for TU-games
• Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
• Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
• Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
• Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
• Preserving or removing special players: what keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games

Cited in

(6)

• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
• Similarities in axiomatizations: equal surplus division value and first-price auctions
• Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
• Axioms of invariance for TU-games
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations

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