A strategic implementation of the sequential equal surplus division rule for digraph cooperative games

DOI10.1007/S10479-016-2290-5zbMATH Open1406.91009OpenAlexW2283557862MaRDI QIDQ2399306FDOQ2399306

Authors: Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal 

Publication date: 22 August 2017

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2015-07.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

implementationsequential equal surplus division`take-it-or-leave-it' procedurebidding approachrooted tree TU-games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Directed graphs (digraphs), tournaments (05C20) Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• Collusion properties of values
• An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value
• Reconciling marginalism with egalitarianism: consistency, monotonicity, and implementation of egalitarian Shapley values
• Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
• Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis
• Sharing a river.
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Implementation of the levels structure value
• Reject and renegotiate: the Shapley value in multilateral bargaining
• Forming efficient networks
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations

Cited In (5)

• Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
• A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
• Axiomatization of an allocation rule for ordered tree TU-games
• The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations
• The Egalitarian Shapley value: a generalization based on coalition sizes

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