Solidarity value for graph games
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Cites work
- A class of social-Shapley values of cooperative games with graph structure
- A new index of power for simple n-person games
- A solidarity value for n-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatic characterizations of the egalitarian solidarity values
- Contributions to the theory of games. Vol. II
- Efficient extensions of communication values
- Efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- Efficient quotient extensions of the Myerson value
- Egalitarian allocation and players of certain type
- Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value
- Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- On convex combinations of two values
- On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- The allocation of marginal surplus for cooperative games with transferable utility
- The efficient proportional Myerson values
- Two-step Shapley-solidarity value for cooperative games with coalition structure
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