Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation

DOI10.2307/1912652zbMath0564.90003OpenAlexW4236189756MaRDI QIDQ3678936

H. Peyton Young

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912652

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitycost allocationAumann-Shapley price mechanismcost accountingsymmetric methodAumann-Shapley value for nonatomic games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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