The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0255-5zbMATH Open1231.91265OpenAlexW2051620431WikidataQ114018292 ScholiaQ114018292MaRDI QIDQ637583FDOQ637583

Eric Bahel

Publication date: 6 September 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0255-5

Recommendations

• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• An axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method
• The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryrankingflowcost sharing methoddemand profile

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Ordinal cost sharing
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• Nearly serial sharing methods
• Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing

Cited In (2)

• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case

This page was built for publication: The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q637583)