The implications of the ranking axiom for discrete cost sharing methods

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0255-5zbMATH Open1231.91265OpenAlexW2051620431WikidataQ114018292 ScholiaQ114018292MaRDI QIDQ637583FDOQ637583

Authors Eric Bahel 

Publication date 6 September 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-010-0255-5

zbMATH Keywords

symmetryrankingflowcost sharing methoddemand profile

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case
• An axiomatization of the serial cost-sharing method
• The serial property and restricted balanced contributions in discrete cost sharing problems
• The additivity and dummy axioms in the discrete cost sharing model
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Characterization of additive cost sharing methods
• Decreasing serial cost sharing under economies of scale
• Incentives, decentralized control, the assignment of joint costs and internal pricing
• Nearly serial sharing methods
• On demand responsiveness in additive cost sharing
• On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method
• Ordinal cost sharing
• Paths and consistency in additive cost sharing
• Responsibility and cross-subsidization in cost sharing
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Three methods to share joint costs or surplus
• Values of Non-Atomic Games

(2)

• Consistency requirements and pattern methods in cost sharing problems with technological cooperation
• Monotonicity and the Aumann-Shapley cost-sharing method in the discrete case

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