Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power

DOI10.2307/2526099zbMath0276.90085OpenAlexW2045092866MaRDI QIDQ4401778

Dermot Gately

Publication date: 1974

Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e547e7638667e0e362b29d850d319c00343a5cc0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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