Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
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Publication:4401778
DOI10.2307/2526099zbMATH Open0276.90085OpenAlexW2045092866MaRDI QIDQ4401778FDOQ4401778
Authors: Dermot Gately 
Publication date: 1974
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e547e7638667e0e362b29d850d319c00343a5cc0
Cited In (17)
- Game theoretic foundations of the gately power measure for directed networks
- Fair ticket pricing in public transport as a constrained cost allocation game
- Efficiency and stability in electrical power transmission networks: a partition function form approach
- Optimization methods for electric utility resource planning
- Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
- On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games
- The value of cooperation in interregional transmission planning: a noncooperative equilibrium model approach
- National-strategic investment in European power transmission capacity
- On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games
- The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
- Cooperative game solution concepts to a cost allocation problem.
- DOES GAME THEORY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN POLICY MAKING IN NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT?
- Competition and cooperation in a bidding model of electrical energy trade
- Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt
- Some new results on least square values for TU games
- Homocores, cores and operational inefficiency in superadditive n-person games†
- Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method
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