Homocores, cores and operational inefficiency in superadditive n-person games†

DOI10.1080/00207728308926504zbMath0556.90100OpenAlexW1978304990WikidataQ126250931 ScholiaQ126250931MaRDI QIDQ3221988

Boaz Golany, A. Charnes

Publication date: 1983

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207728308926504

zbMATH Keywords

\(n\)-person superadditive characteristic function gameshomocoreimplicit bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• A competitive test of the descriptive accuracy of the characteristic function, power function, and Shapley value based function
• On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power

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