Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method

DOI10.1007/BF01414213zbMath0788.90091MaRDI QIDQ3142158

Gertjan D. Otten

Publication date: 8 December 1993

Published in: ZOR - Methods and Models of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cost allocationreduced gamealternate cost avoided methodmultipurpose water projectsvariable player set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions, Compromise values in cooperative game theory

Cites Work

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