Characterizations of a game theoretical cost allocation method
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Cites work
- A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
- A Survey of Consistency Properties in Cooperative Game Theory
- An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
- Axiomatization of the Nucleolus
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- Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems
- Game theory and the Tennessee Valley Authority
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- On the reduced game property and its converse
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
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- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
Cited in
(7)- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5569959 (Why is no real title available?)
- Cost-sharing models
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6389561 (Why is no real title available?)
- Compromise values in cooperative game theory
- On the cost of game playing: how to control the expenses in mixed strategies
- Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions
- Game Theory and Cost Allocation Problems
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