On the predictive efficiency of the core solution in side-payment games

DOI10.1007/BF00133460zbMath0524.90099MaRDI QIDQ594014

Kathryn Potter, H. Andrew Michener, Melvin M. Sakurai

Publication date: 1983

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecore2-centerdisruption nucleolusequality solutiongoodness-of-fit measurepredictive accuracyside-payment games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values ⋮ Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core ⋮ Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets ⋮ A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games

Cites Work

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