Experiments on bilateral bargaining in markets

DOI10.1007/s11238-010-9231-6zbMath1209.91075OpenAlexW2075297820MaRDI QIDQ2430007

Stefan Pfau, André Casajus, Andreas Tutić

Publication date: 5 April 2011

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-010-9231-6

zbMATH Keywords

experimentTU gamesoutside optionsgloves game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment

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