Improved weighted Shapley Value model for the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition

DOI10.1155/2013/269398MaRDI QIDQ2249283zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Na Xu

Publication date 1 July 2014

Published in Journal of Control Science and Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/269398

zbMATH Keywords

fourth party logistics supply chain coalitionweighted Shapley Value model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Transportation, logistics and supply chain management (90B06) Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Hierarchical systems (93A13)

Review text

Summary: How to make the individual get the reasonable and practical profit among the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition system is still a question for further study. Considering the characteristics of the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition, this paper combines Shapley Value with Distribution according to Contribution, two methods in the application, and then adjusts the profit allocated to each member reasonably based on the actual coalition situation named improved weighted Shapley Value model. In this paper, we first analyze the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition profit allocation models, the classical Shapley Value method. Then, we analyze the weight of individual enterprise in the coalition by the analytic hierarchy process. To each enterprise, the weight is determined by the investment risks, information divulging risks, and failure risks. Finally, the numerical study shows that the profit allocation method improved weighted Shapley Value model is relatively rational and practical. Thus, the proposed combined model is a useful profit allocation mechanism for the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition that the contribution and risks are fully considered.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(4)

• A novel intensive distribution logistics network design and profit allocation problem considering sharing economy
• Revenue distribution of hybrid channel supply chain based on modified Shapley value with cost
• The improved Shapley model of multi-party cooperation profit distribution in trans-provincial power transactions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5044376 (Why is no real title available?)

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