The family of least square values for transferable utility games
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Publication:1268658
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0622zbMath0910.90276OpenAlexW2008918413MaRDI QIDQ1268658
Federico Valenciano, Luis Manuel Sánchez Ruiz, José Manuel Zarzuelo
Publication date: 8 December 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0622
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Cites Work
- Dynamics of cooperative games
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The kernel of a cooperative game
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