The family of least square values for transferable utility games

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0622zbMath0910.90276MaRDI QIDQ1268658

Federico Valenciano, Luis Manuel Sánchez Ruiz, José Manuel Zarzuelo

Publication date: 8 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0622

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley value; coalitional excesses; preimputation set; weighted variance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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