The least square values and the Shapley value for cooperative TU games

DOI10.1007/BF02579002zbMATH Open1111.90006MaRDI QIDQ874882FDOQ874882

Irinel Dragan

Publication date: 10 April 2007

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

inverse problemShapley valuecooperative TU gamesaverage per capita formulaleast square valuespotential basis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Inventory, storage, reservoirs (90B05)

Cites Work

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• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• The family of least square values for transferable utility games
• New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
• Allocation processes in cooperative games

Cited In (10)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
• A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
• Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
• The least square B-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games
• Bases and Transforms of Set Functions
• Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems

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