The least square values and the Shapley value for cooperative TU games
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Publication:874882
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- Allocation processes in cooperative games
- New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value
- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
Cited in
(15)- A stochastic approach to approximate values in cooperative games
- On the inverse problem for a subclass of linear, symmetric and efficient values of cooperative TU games
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- On a family of values for TU-games generalizing the Shapley value
- Different least square values, different rankings
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6099645 (Why is no real title available?)
- The least square B-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games
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- Least Square Approximations and Linear Values of Cooperative Games
- On the semivalues and the least square values average per capita formulas and relationships
- Bases and linear transforms of TU-games and cooperation systems
- Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
- Bases and Transforms of Set Functions
- Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions
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