The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector

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Publication:1814786

DOI10.1007/BF01254388zbMath0855.90147OpenAlexW1994253272MaRDI QIDQ1814786

Federico Valenciano, José Manuel Zarzuelo, Luis Manuel Sánchez Ruiz

Publication date: 24 November 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254388




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