The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector

DOI10.1007/BF01254388zbMath0855.90147OpenAlexW1994253272MaRDI QIDQ1814786

Federico Valenciano, José Manuel Zarzuelo, Luis Manuel Sánchez Ruiz

Publication date: 24 November 1996

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254388

zbMATH Keywords

TU gamesaxiomatic characterizationsnucleolusprenucleolusleast square nucleolusrelative fairnessleast square prenucleolusexcess vector

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (34)

Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations ⋮ EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS ⋮ On membership and marginal values ⋮ A solution concept for network games: the role of multilateral interactions ⋮ Individual weighted excess and least square values ⋮ Values for environments with externalities -- the average approach ⋮ Cooperation and sharing costs in a tandem queueing network ⋮ Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value ⋮ \(k\)-additive upper approximation of TU-games ⋮ Minimum norm solutions for cooperative games ⋮ On an extension of the concept of TU-games and their values ⋮ Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value ⋮ Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value ⋮ ``Procedural values for cooperative games ⋮ Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games ⋮ Linear symmetric rankings for TU-games ⋮ The least square B-nucleolus for fuzzy cooperative games ⋮ The family of ideal values for cooperative games ⋮ The least square nucleolus is a normalized Banzhaf value ⋮ Novel equal division values based on players' excess vectors and their applications to logistics enterprise coalitions ⋮ Rankings and values for team games ⋮ On the semivalues and the least square values average per capita formulas and relationships ⋮ The axiomatic approach to three values in games with coalition structure ⋮ A non-parametric approach to testing the axioms of the Shapley value with limited data ⋮ The general prenucleolus of \(n\)-person cooperative fuzzy games ⋮ Some new results on least square values for TU games ⋮ The family of least square values for transferable utility games ⋮ Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value ⋮ Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value ⋮ THE EGALITARIAN NON-k-AVERAGED CONTRIBUTION (EN^kAC-) VALUE FOR TU-GAMES ⋮ Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs ⋮ The nucleolus is well-posed ⋮ The equalizer and the lexicographical solutions for cooperative fuzzy games: Characterization and properties ⋮ On a new method of analyzing properties of efficient, symmetric and linear values of TU-games

Cites Work

• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
• Mathematical Properties of the Banzhaf Power Index
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector