Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2401521
DOI10.1007/s10957-017-1092-5zbMath1371.91011OpenAlexW2592019717MaRDI QIDQ2401521
Hao Sun, Theo S. H. Driessen, Panfei Sun, Dongshuang Hou
Publication date: 1 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-017-1092-5
Related Items
The equal collective gains value in cooperative games, Players' dummification and the dummified egalitarian non-separable contribution value, Responsibility and sharing the cost of cleaning a polluted river, Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value, Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Some new results on least square values for TU games
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- Associated consistency and Shapley value
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- Associated consistency characterization of two linear values for TU games by matrix approach
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Associated consistency and equal allocation of nonseparable costs
- Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value
- Models in Cooperative Game Theory
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
