Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value

DOI10.1155/2020/4674279zbMath1459.91008OpenAlexW3033560649MaRDI QIDQ778672

Wenna Wang, Hui Yang, Zhengsheng Ding

Publication date: 3 July 2020

Published in: Mathematical Problems in Engineering (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1155/2020/4674279

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
• The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
• On weighted Shapley values
• Procedural interpretation and associated consistency for the Egalitarian Shapley values
• The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
• ``Procedural values for cooperative games
• Dealing with complex transaction costs in portfolio management
• Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
• A game theory approach for cooperative control to improve data quality and false data detection in WSN
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