Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
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Publication:2329151
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 41329 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
- Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
Cited in
(5)- Sharing the surplus and proportional values
- The family of ideal values for cooperative games
- Procedural implementation and axiomatization of the weighted nonseparable cost value
- A generalization of the CIS value for cooperative cost games
- Process and optimization implementation of the \(\alpha \)-ENSC value
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