Procedural and optimization implementation of the weighted ENSC value
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Publication:2329151
DOI10.1007/S11238-019-09697-5zbMATH Open1426.91020OpenAlexW2905428352WikidataQ128120142 ScholiaQ128120142MaRDI QIDQ2329151FDOQ2329151
Authors: Dongshuang Hou, Aymeric Lardon, Panfei Sun, Hao Sun 
Publication date: 17 October 2019
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-019-09697-5
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Cites Work
- The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The kernel of a cooperative game
- The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- The least square prenucleolus and the least square nucleolus. Two values for TU games based on the excess vector
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Fairness in simple bargaining experiments
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Optimization implementation and characterization of the equal allocation of nonseparable costs value
- Axiomatization and implementation of a class of solidarity values for TU-games
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