Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations
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Publication:268613
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2015.12.005zbMath1368.91016OpenAlexW2223350144MaRDI QIDQ268613
Takayuki Oishi, Yukihiko Funaki, Toru Hokari, Mikio Nakayama
Publication date: 15 April 2016
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.12.005
Related Items (17)
Facets of the cone of exact games ⋮ Networks, Communication and Hierarchy: Applications to Cooperative Games ⋮ Consistency, population solidarity, and egalitarian solutions for TU-games ⋮ Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ Value-free reductions ⋮ On the existence of the Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution ⋮ Balanced externalities and the proportional allocation of nonseparable contributions ⋮ Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions ⋮ Axiomatic analysis of liability problems with rooted-tree networks in tort law ⋮ Monotonicity implies linearity: characterizations of convex combinations of solutions to cooperative games ⋮ Games with a permission structure -- a survey on generalizations and applications ⋮ Facets of the cone of totally balanced games ⋮ Antiduality in exact partition games ⋮ Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions ⋮ Redistribution to the less productive: parallel characterizations of the egalitarian Shapley and consensus values ⋮ Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ⋮ Self-antidual extensions and subsolutions
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